Abstract
Introduction
Labor contracts bind individuals to organizations for limited or unlimited times. The character of this partial inclusion can be regarded as a distinguishing characteristic of "staff" as a social category. (Türk, 1978, p. 219) . Often labor contracts are institutionalized contracts. This analysis compares two types of contracts: Spot contracts, which are ruled by the market forces, and institutionalized contracts, which are characterized mainly by the job security for all the spells of their duration. The institutionalized contracts can be differentiated in short term contracts, which guarantee employment only for the following spell (T=1) and long term contracts which guarantee employment for at least two spells (T>1).
Among the advantages of institutionalized contracts are lower transaction costs and aspects of incentive compatability (Becker, 1985, p. 55) . The main argument against long term contracts is that they reduce flexibility: The longer the duration of the contract, the harder it will be for the firm to adjust its employment to changes in its environment (Kossbiel, 1997, p. 22) . Labor contracts imply an allocation of risk, because if the wages and the employment of a worker are fixed for a given period, the firm bears the risk of cyclical fluctuations. The willingness of risk averse, bernoullirational (V. Neumann/ Morgenstern, 1944, p. 15-31) workers to pay insurance premiums for the income certainty linked with institutionalized contracts depends on two factors, first the shape of their utility function (or the degree of risk aversion) and second on the perceived risks of unemployment under spot contracting in each spell of their planning period. The greater the probability of employment in each spell, the lower the threat of bearing the risk.
In this paper, the states of nature that could occur if workers take spot contracts are dichotomous: Either they are employed at a (fixed) market wage or they are unemployed and receive an unemployment benefit. So if a worker has a time perspective of T spells, a lottery in each spell T t is defined. The paper focuses on the impact of the length of an individual´s time perspective on his willingness to pay insurance premiums to obtain an institutionalized contract over T spells which would eliminate the risk of being unemployed in each spell T t . For simplification, it will be assumed that the states of nature in different spells are stochastically independent. The argumentation refers methodically to the comparison of distributions with mean preserving spreads 3 according to the associated risk developed by ROTHSCHILD and STIGLITZ. Therefore the first step will be to analyze the relation between length of time perspective and risk.
After that, the implications of this relationship for the optimal duration of institutionalized labor contracts will be examined.
Basic assumptions of the analysis
The market wage will be regarded as being fixed. The uncertainty of a worker´s income derives from the possibility of being unemployed in each spell which is caused to the stochasticity of business cycle. The firm has two alternative labor policies: First, in the beginning of each spell, after the firm detects the true state of nature, workers can be employed by a one-spell spot contract. Second, workers can be employed by an institutionalized contract at the end of a spell for at least the next spell. In this case the contract is made before the firm is able to detect the true state of nature. The probability that the high income will occur in a spell is µ for all spells, the probability of the low income min in each spell is 1 µ . According to T, with two possible states of nature in each spell ( max min , ) there are 2 T different states of 1 The analysis is confines on utility functions with a single argument. For expandations on multi-variable utility functions of risk averse agents see for example R.E. Kihlstrom/ L.J. Mirman (1974, p. 361-388) . 2 According to B. Hansson (1988, p. 156) , concavity of an utility function including monetary arguments can be explained by consumption increasing in wealth: The individual starts purchasing goods bearing a high utility. While wealth increases, more goods will be purchased but with a decreasing utility. Therefore, the number of states of nature which have to be regarded reduces to T + 1 3 .
Determination of the insurance premium for a short term institutionalized contract (T=1).
This section takes a closer look at an institutionalized contract which guarantees employment to the workers for the following spell at a fixed wage. The maximum wage concession an individual would be willing to accept for the employment certainty gained by rejecting spot contracting will be discussed.
Risk premiums are an indicator of an individual´s willingness to pay in order to obtain certainty. The risk premium an individual would be willing to pay in order to be insured on the expected value RP is the difference between the expected value of a stochastic outcome { } E and the certainty equivalent of the stochastic outcome
The certainty equivalent s is the certain value of income that has the same utility as the expected utility of a lottery defined over T + 1 states of nature (Laux, 1982, p. 199 Usually individuals will not insure themselves to the expected value of wealth but to the highest value of wealth. The corresponding premium in this paper will be referred to "insurance premium" s . This is the amount of money an individual would be willing to pay to receive the high income in each spell of contract duration T. So the individual will be insured to a total income of T max . s is therefore defined as s s = max .
3 If m=0, then this special state of nature is characterized by the sequence of low incomes in each spell.
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As is obvious, the insurance premium decreases as the certainty equivalent increases.
The relation between RP and s will be shown in figure 1:
Figure 1: Risk and insurance premium (Taylor, 1987 , p. 129 or Sinn, 1989 4. The constitution of a binomial distribution of income associated with spot contracting 
The expressions the probability function of a binomial distribution (Hochstädter, 1989, p. 360) .
The influence of the length of individual time perspectives on the insurance premium

The order of distributions according to the risk involved by Rothschild and
Stiglitz
ROTHSCHILD and STIGLITZ argue a distribution Y is more risky than a distribution X if the following condition holds: "If X and Y have density functions f and g, and if g was obtained from f by taking some of the probability weight from the center of f and adding it to each tail of f in such a way as to leave the mean unchanged, then it seems reasonable to say that Y is more uncertain than X" (Rothschild/ Stiglitz, 1970, p. 226) 4 .
Underlying of this definition of increasing risk is that the two distribution functions have the same mean, so one can be regarded as a mean-preserving-spread of the other. If one compares two different distributions X and Y of the total income , than the condition for an identical mean as a necessary condition in order to be able to compare these distributions is (Diamond/ Stiglitz, 1974, p. 338 (Diamond/ Stiglitz, 1974, p. 339) .
Application of the Rothschild-Stiglitz-conditions to binomial distributions
Now, the central question is if two intertemporal dependent binomial distributions satisfy the Rothschild-Stiglitz-conditions, so that it is possible to speak of an increased risk as a consequence of lowering T and vice versa. Here intertemporal dependence of two binomial distributions refers to a consideration of average values of income:
According to the stochastical independence, the stochastic total income over T spells can be regarded as the sum of the stochastic incomes received in each single spell:
The total income over T spells can be calculated as an average income per spell by simply dividing the total income in a certain state of nature by the number of intervals The relationship between the expected value of T=1 and the expected value of T>1 is as follows (Maibaum, 1980, p. 143 If you use the average values described above, you get
Therefore the alternation of the number of intervals (T) can be regarded as a mean preserving spread if you look at the average values. Graphically this can be shown in figure 2 (Rothschild/ Stiglitz, 1970, p. 230) : If one compares the areas of the distribution functions (average values) for T =3 and T =1, one will see that the areas are identical which implies A+B=C. The reason for that is the stochastic independence, e.g. the probability that max or min occurs in each spell, is always µ and 1 µ (Hochstädter, 1989, p. 363) . So the distribution functions can be compared according to the risk involved. property (Diamond/ Stiglitz, 1974, p. 338-339) . This implies that for every * the integral of the distribution function of T = 1 can never be smaller than the integral of the distribution function of an average income of T > 1. This is the proof that every distribution function of average income for T > 1 is less risky than for T = 1 (Diamond/ Stiglitz, 1974, p. 338) . The decrease of risk with increasing T can be explained by the effect of smoothing income over time with longer time perspective.
Implications of decreasing risk in T for the insurance premium
One of the main determinants of the insurance premium is the expected utility
ROTHSCHILD and STIGLITZ show that if the utility function is concave, the expected utility of the more risky distribution is smaller than the expected utility of the less risky distribution function 5 . In our case the following relation holds because of the effect of smoothing income over time which increases in T:
In the example, the insurance premium in the case T =1 is:
( ) 
Application of the theoretical analysis on the theory of implicit labor contracts
The theory of implicit labor contracts as a theory of risk allocation 6 can be regarded as an application of the Bernoulli-principle of normative decision theory. An important assumption of this theory is that employers and workers have different attitudes towards risk. These assumption goes back to KNIGHT (1921, p. 271-272) . Employers can be characterized as being less riskaverse than workers are because they can shift at least part of the risk to capital markets (Rosen, 1985 (Rosen, , p. 1148 . Workers usually only have their human capital which cannot be used to build diversified portfolios (Rosen, 1985, p. 1148), because it is hardly possible for a worker to be employed in different firms at the same time (Taylor, 1987, p. 126) . So employers will be more willing to bear risks. A common assumption in literature is that firms are assumed to be risk neutral, while workers are assumed to be risk averse (Taylor, 1987, p. 126) . These different attitudes towards risk offer the possibility of generating a paretoefficient allocation of risk by shifting the income risk from the workers to the firms. The firms earn insurance or risk premiums from the workers. This leads to a substitution of the neoclassical spot market by contractual agreements: "Nevertheless, at least part of the risk an uncertain labor income stream creates for its recipient can be shifted to third parties by employee intermediation, that is, by the tacit or open commitment of the firm to guarantee its personnel that their wage rates, hours worked, employment status, or a combination of all such factors, will be in some degree independent of the vicissitudes of the business cycle" 11 (Azariadis, 1975 (Azariadis, , p. 1184 . The change from the principle of the "invisible hand" to the principle of a so called "invisible handshake" (Okun, 1981, p. 89 his effort to the production department. His marginal product will be passed to his credit by the finance department. Due to an implicit contract the wage will be fixed. If the marginal product is smaller than that wage, the insurance department pays the difference to the worker, if the marginal product is higher than the fixed wage, the insurance department will get the difference as an insurance premium. The finance department pays the worker the fixed wage: worker effort fixed wage production finance insurance
Marginal product payment or premium
Figure 3: The firm acting as an insurance company
If the firm is risk neutral and the outcome of production is given, then the firm´s objective is to minimize the expected sum of wages. Therefore, it will prefer every fixed This means for example, if T=3 for a specific worker, he will never be willing to pay more than 12 . 250 $ 3 36 , 750 $ = as an insurance premium in order to get $1000 in each spell. If the firm offers a short term contract (T=1) with an insurance premium of $272.42, he will reject it and prefer joining the lottery of spot contracting (which includes the risk of being unemployed).
So the length of the individual workers planning period is decisive. The shorter this time perspective is, the higher is the opportunity for the firm to monopolize insurance premiums. Individuals differ in their willingness to pay insurance premiums if they have different time perspectives. This enables the firm to discriminate: Individuals with comparatively shorter time perspectives due to their individual circumstances of life, are willing to accept lower fixed wages than individuals with a larger time perspective, because the income risk of spot contracting is higher for those individuals.
An important task is now to identify the determinants of the individual time perspective.
In other words: What makes some people more short sighted than others? There are three main determinants that can be identified:
7 "...they are exchanged for some implicit set of commitments, hereinafter called an implicit labor contract, on the part of the firm to employ the owner of those labor services for a ´reasonable´ period of 13 -Individual circumstances of life -Liquidity -Individual traits
Examples for the individual circumstances of life are age, health or the option of a socially accepted alternative role (Offe/ Hinrichs, 1977 ). An example for the correlation between age and individual attitude towards risk are the various investment funds offered by banks and insurance companies which are developed for people at different ages: Funds which aim to provide a provision for old age vary in the fractions of safe assets and risky assets; funds with a relatively higher fraction of risky assets are designed for younger people. This can be regarded as an answer to the constantly reducing time perspective associated with a higher age.
Liquidity is influenced by the individual´s wealth: It determines the individual ability to survive over several periods without any work income. If liquidity is very low, a lottery for even the next spell can be regarded as an existential threat.
There is a link between liquidity and the individual circumstances of life: For example for older people it is more difficult to receive a mortgage loan than for younger individuals. In addition the existence of private wealth enables a person to join in an alternative besides the role as a worker without the need to finance life through social systems. There is also empirical evidence that the income of other household members really influences the labor supply of an individual (W. Franz, 1981, p. 104) .
Finally even if two persons are identical according to their individual circumstances of life and liquidity they might differ in their time perspectives: This residual difference can be explained by genetic predisposition or socialisation (Argyris, 1957, p. 48-50) .
Apart from their willingness to work for less, having workers with short time perspectives may have some severe disadvantages for the firm: For example the time to amortize investments in human capital is less, transaction costs will be higher due to fluctuation, and the hazards of opportunistic behavior increase. So the usability of short sighted workers will be restricted for the firm. Therefore, there is no reason to expect that a higher demand for less costly, short sighted workers will occur and so competition could eliminate those wage differences. If the firm establishes different classes of positions, designed for workers with different time perspectives and differing according time and on terms mutually agreed upon in advance". Azariadis, 1975 Azariadis, , S. 1185 to the degree of specifity of traits, this can be interpreted as a segmentation of the labor market caused by differences in time perspectives.
The need of coexisting spot contracts
The analysis above was based on the implicit assumption that spot contracting still exists besides institutionalized contractual agreements including the insurance argument. One objection that can be raised could be as follows: If the insurance of the workers is advantageous for the firms, no firm will be willing to offer spot contracts. If there are no more spot contracts, the firms could lower the wages until workers receive a reservation wage determined by an outside option. This is not likely to occur for the following reason: The objection above only focuses on wages. This is not realistic because fixed employment contracts have one severe disadvantage for the firm: They reduce flexibility for the firms. Even an institutionalized short term contract creates this problem because the firm will not be able to get rid of workers for the next period. If the business cycle declines, the firm may suffer from costly staff overloads. Thus firms offer spot contracts so they can adjust their workforce immediately to sudden changes in environment (Bürkle 2000 (Bürkle , 2002 . So there may be two coexisting employment systems within a single firm: An external labor market which will be ruled by the market (spot contracting) and an internal labor market where market powers will be substituted by institutional arrangements 8 . The optimal size of the two labor market segments can be found by taking into account two components, the expected costs caused by wages C w and the expected costs caused by inflexibility C f 9 .
Figure 4, which is regarded to be heuristic, will show the shape of these two functions depending on the degree of internalization, which increases the larger the number of workers employed in the internal segment is. The degree of internalization I (Bürkle, 2002 ) is operationalized by
The number of workers employed in the internal labor market is given by h. This is divided through the maximum of the staff requirements PR that is expected by the firm to occur in the future during its planning period. For I=1, the internal labor market is large enough to satisfy all possible future personnel requirements. If the firm only offers spot contracts (no internal labor market, h=0), then I=0. . For I=0 C f will be zero because there are no institutional agreements (no internal labor market) which might restrict the firm´s possibility to adjust its labor force.
The optimum of I* will be the minimum of the sumfunction. For all 0<I*<1 spot contracting and institutionalized contracts coexist. This coexistence of both types of employment relations will be the most likely case to expect in an uncertain environment.
It can be described as a "hybrid" (Williamson, 1991, p. 23 ) form of organization because it combines elements of the market with institutional elements. The existence of spot contracting enables the firm to transfer the risks of adjustment to the external labor market (Brandes/ Weise, 1983, S. 63) and therefore it enables the firm to adjust the size of their labor force to shocks caused by product markets.
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So as a conclusion, spot contracting will still occur. As a consequence workers always have the possibility to join the lottery. So every institutional arrangement will be compared by the workers to the lottery. The coexistence of the lottery is one of the key assumptions underlying the risk theoretic results derived earlier in this paper.
Final Conclusions
This paper analyses the impact of a risk averse individual´s time perspective on his willingness to pay for an insurance to avoid the income risk which is derived from the employment risk. Based on the assumptions which led to a binomial distribution of a worker´s income over a given time period, we showed that willingness to pay for an First the students had to estimate the highest price, they would individually pay to join in the lottery. Second, the students were asked if they are willing to pay less, the same or a higher amount in each period if they had to join in the same lottery for three periods (the lottery is regarded in this case as being repeated for three times). The results were as shown:
-6 students (7,59%) were willing to pay for the single lottery more than $1000.
They can be regarded as being venturesome.
-11 students (13,92%) were willing to pay for the single lottery a prize of exactly $1000. They can be regarded as being risk neutral.
-62 students (78,48%) were willing to pay for the single lottery less than $1000.
They can be regarded as being risk averse.
In the case of the (three times) repeated lottery, 43 students belonging to the group of the risk averters, pointed out that they would be willing to pay more than in the single period case, 17 (risk averse) students were willing to pay exactly the same amount each period, only two (risk averse) students pointed out that there willingness to pay in each of the three periods would decrease. So if you look at the risk averse students more than 69 % were willing to pay a higher amount in each period if the lottery is repeated.
Without the claim of being representative this survey can be regarded as a indication, that risks are really perceived by a significant fraction of people in a way that corresponds to the analysis developed in this paper.
From a risk theoretical point of view a sequence of short term contracts (T=1) will be advantageous for the firm. If a worker´s time perspective T is an individual trait, then it might be advantageous for the firm to employ workers with short time perspectives. If workers are employed at positions without specific traits the advantages of long term contracts do not exist. So in this case the firm is better off if it employs workers with short time perspectives.
